Saturday, December 24, 2011
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Western intervention in Middle East
Monday, December 19, 2011
Friday, December 16, 2011
Monday, December 12, 2011
Thursday, December 8, 2011
US authorized teaqr gas to Egypt during protests
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
Iran war on drugs
Monday, December 5, 2011
Crisis foreclosures Fed help to banks
DEA drug money laundering Mexico
Friday, December 2, 2011
Monday, November 28, 2011
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
Student protests Occupy Ohio
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
Friday, November 18, 2011
Italy euro crisis
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Iran nuclear
Friday, October 28, 2011
Japan nuclear bomb
Monday, October 24, 2011
Sunday, October 23, 2011
Saturday, October 1, 2011
Friday, September 23, 2011
Afghan budget paid by US and NATO
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Suicide debt crisis greece
Sunday, September 18, 2011
Arab spring
Saturday, September 17, 2011
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
Mexico drugs
Friday, August 26, 2011
Mexico drugs
Monday, August 22, 2011
US in Afghanistan until 2024http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif
The report from the Daily Telegraph is here.
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Friday, August 12, 2011
Thursday, August 11, 2011
DEA on narco-terrorism in Afghanistan
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct021204.htm
DEA Congressional Testimony
February 12, 2004
Statement of
Karen P. Tandy
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
Before the
Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
February 12, 2004
"United States Policy Towards Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan"
Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on the important issue of opium production in Afghanistan and its potential links to terrorism.
Overview
Afghan drug production is a priority for the DEA that guides our enforcement strategy in the region. As you know, opium production in Afghanistan has resumed over the last two years, although it is still lower than the highest level reached under the Taliban. While we expect that only a small portion of the resulting opium and heroin will ultimately reach the United States, these drugs are of great concern because they increase worldwide supply and have the potential to fund terrorists and other destabilizing groups. Because the situation inside Afghanistan presents unique challenges to law enforcement, the DEA has successfully acted with neighboring countries to control the spread of Afghan opium and heroin through Operation Containment.
I have just returned from Kabul where Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles, other senior officials representing the United States, and I participated in discussions with Afghanistan Transitional Authority President Hamid Karzai, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Director Antonio Costa and other representatives from Afghanistan and the European Union on the challenges posed by Afghan drug production. The international drug control community shares our view that concerted multilateral efforts will be required to effectively address these problems. I look forward to discussing each of these important issues with the Committee.
Afghanistan Poppy Production and the U.S. Response
Significant Opium Production Resumes
Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate products. It has historically produced significant quantities of opium, and accounted for over 70 percent of the world's supply in the year 2000, when the United States government estimated Afghan opium production at 3,656 metric tons. In 2001, the Taliban banned the cultivation of opium poppy. The DEA believes that the ban was likely an attempt by the Taliban to raise the price of opium which had fallen significantly due to the abundant supply produced in years prior to 2001. Regardless of intent, production plummeted to 74 metric tons in 2001.
With the fall of the Taliban, Afghan growers resumed cultivation despite renewal of the ban on poppy growth by the Karzai government. Opium production has returned to its historically substantial amounts, although it is important to emphasize that it has not yet reached the level of poppy recorded in 2000. In 2003, the United States Government officially estimated production of 2,865 metric tons of oven-dried opium from 61,000 hectares of poppy cultivation.
Afghanistan: Estimated Annual Potential Opium Production (Metric Tons)
2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000 | 1999 | 1998 | 1997 | 1996 |
2,865 | 1,278 | 74 | 3,656 | 2,861 | 2,340 | 2,184 | 2,099 |
Heroin Production and Movement
The opium produced in Afghanistan is readily made into narcotics to be sold on the international market, much of which eventually reaches users in Europe. While Europe is the primary destination for Afghan heroin, much of the opium remains in Southwest Asia for local consumption. Laboratories convert the opium into morphine base, white heroin, or one of several grades of brown heroin. Large processing laboratories are located in southern Afghanistan; smaller laboratories are located in other areas of the country, including the Nangarhar Province. In addition, morphine base produced in Afghanistan is shipped to traffickers based in Turkey and converted to heroin.
Transporting converted opium from Afghanistan is no easy task. Larger than the State of Texas, Afghanistan is landlocked, forcing traffickers to rely on challenging overland routes to move drug shipments out of the country. In addition to the traditional smuggling routes through Iran to Turkey, our intelligence reports indicate continued movement of heroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States, notably Tajikistan, to Russia. Some of the heroin is consumed in Russia, while a portion moves on to other markets. Afghan heroin also moves through India enroute to international markets and continues to be trafficked through Pakistan, where heroin is smuggled out through airports and vessels leaving the Pakistan coast.
DEA intelligence suggests that relatively little Afghan heroin is ultimately destined for the United States, although we continue to monitor carefully the market for potential new trends. Through the Heroin Signature Program (HSP), the DEA Special Testing and Research Laboratory analyzes samples from seizures at ports of entry and other randomly selected sources to determine their purity and geographic origin. In 2002, Southwest Asian heroin (which includes Afghan heroin) accounted for ten percent of the weight of all samples analyzed. Preliminary data for 2003 indicate that Southwest Asian heroin was eight percent by weight of the sample, although the 2003 survey is not yet complete. Similarly, the Domestic Monitor Program (DMP), which examines samples bought undercover on American streets to monitor their characteristics, showed that Southwest Asian heroin represented four percent of samples in 2002 and five percent in 2003. Neither HSP nor DMP results should be equated with market share, but rather suggest availability over time.
The DEA's Response Inside Afghanistan
Opium production in Afghanistan nonetheless is a significant concern and a priority for the DEA because of its impact on worldwide drug supply and its potential, as I will discuss later, to provide financial support to terrorists and other destabilizing groups. In assessing strategies to control and respond to this production, it is important to understand the significant operational obstacles we face in Afghanistan. Three decades of civil war and unrest have left the criminal justice system in disarray. Outside of Kabul, the country is not uniformly controlled by the central government. DEA has no national or local drug enforcement counterparts and Afghanistan lacks many of the most basic elements of its criminal justice institutions. Due to security constraints, DEA's presence in Afghanistan is limited to two agents, whose movement and ability to conduct traditional drug enforcement operations are severely restricted.
The DEA's Kabul Country Office, reopened in February 2003, nonetheless is making superb contributions under these difficult circumstances. DEA agents continue to gather and disseminate intelligence to U.S. and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. We have made the collection and analysis of drug intelligence a priority within Afghanistan and Central Asia and are supporting a Department of Defense initiative to open an intelligence "fusion center" for multinational information sharing. Our country office also continues to debrief confidential sources in Kabul and supports domestic and foreign drug enforcement operations.
The DEA also works with other federal agencies on law enforcement matters in Afghanistan. Three months ago, DEA's Kabul Country Office personnel assisted the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the U.S. Army, traveling by convoy from Kabul to Kunduz to recruit police officers and soldiers for the Afghanistan Police Force and to conduct a site survey for a new Regional Law Enforcement Training Center to be funded by the United States. The mission was successful: for example, the Konduz RTC will be operational in March.
Operation Containment
The challenges to law enforcement within Afghanistan strongly suggested the need for a simultaneous, concerted effort to control Afghan drugs in neighboring countries before they can spread to broader markets. Operation Containment is a large-scale, multinational law enforcement initiative begun in early 2002 under the leadership of the DEA and with special support from Congress. Emphasizing coordination and information sharing among nineteen countries from Central Asia, the Caucuses, Europe and Russia, the program aims to implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency. It has been enormously successful, and I would like to thank the Committee for its strong support for this initiative.
The DEA supports Operation Containment worldwide, particularly in Pakistan, Turkey, Russia, and Central Asia. We have expanded existing offices in Europe and Southwest Asia and opened a new office in Uzbekistan. The DEA has assigned Special Agents to its Kabul, Ankara, Istanbul, Tashkent, Moscow and London Offices to support Operation Containment. In addition, one Intelligence Specialist and one support position are assigned in Ankara and one support position is assigned in Tashkent to support Operation Containment. DEA is also seeking approval to assign two Special Agents to Kyrgyzstan and additional agent and intelligence personnel to Uzbekistan and Brussels for Operation Containment.
Another key element is the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), a program that has been highly successful in other regions of the world. An SIU is made up of host nation law enforcement personnel, who are individually screened to protect against corruption and then specially trained and equipped to DEA standards. We have established a new DEA SIU in Uzbekistan, and the DEA SIU in Pakistan has made several significant seizures. These DEA-lead units provide critical and valuable assistance to anti-drug efforts in their countries.
Intelligence sharing is also a priority, with the initiative supporting regional intelligence sharing centers in Bucharest, Romania and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and a short-term Fusion Center program in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. DEA has temporarily assigned an Intelligence Analyst to the Bucharest intelligence center.
Operation Containment has been a great success. Since March 2002, it has resulted in 23 significant seizures of narcotics and precursor chemicals and led to the dismantlement and disruption of several major distribution/transportation organizations involved in the Southwest Asian drug trade. These include the disruption three months ago in Istanbul of the Galip Kuyucu transportation group, which was one of the most significant heroin traffickers in Turkey and a Justice Department international priority target. The Turkish National Police, working with the DEA and Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, seized 495 kilograms of heroin, and disrupted this organization, which was regularly transporting similarly sized amounts of drugs throughout Western Europe. This investigation also led to the arrest of Urfi Cetinkaya, a major source of heroin supply with direct ties to Afghan drug traffickers.
Another significant success for Operation Containment was the arrest of 15 members of the Attila Ozyildirim heroin trafficking organization and the seizure of 7.4 tons of morphine base in Turkey during March 2002. This is the largest seizure of morphine base ever made. To put the magnitude of this seizure in perspective - the amount seized was more than four times greater than the total worldwide morphine base seizures made in 2000. Morphine base can be converted to heroin at a ratio of 1:1.
Drug Enforcement Training
The DEA is also working to build law enforcement capability and cooperation in Afghanistan and throughout the region. During October 2002, we participated along with officials from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry in a United Nations International Narcotics Control Board conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan regarding Operation Topaz. Operation Topaz is intended to bring together law enforcement in several nations to detect and seize suspicious and unauthorized shipments of acetic anhydride, the primary precursor chemical used in the production of heroin.
We have particularly emphasized training for foreign law enforcement agencies, including a three week seminar conducted last September in the United States for high-level police managers. General Hilaluddin Hilal, Afghanistan's Deputy Interior Minister of Security Affairs, attended the course, which took place at both DEA Headquarters and the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia. I participated in this seminar personally as did members of the DEA's senior management, and we believe that it helped to begin and improve important partnerships with and among DEA and the international agencies involved.
During 2004, the DEA plans to conduct Drug Unit Commander training courses in Turkey and Uzbekistan. These one-week courses are funded through Operation Containment and are geared for supervisors of operational drug units. We anticipate that five to ten participants from throughout Afghanistan will attend each school. In addition, DEA is expanding its training efforts throughout the region during 2004, with training courses scheduled in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Thailand and India.
Links between Terrorism and the Afghan Drug Trade
DEA's Role in Fighting Terrorism
Mr. Chairman, the Committee has also asked me to address the potential links between terrorism and trafficking of Afghan opium and heroin. Last September, President Bush thanked DEA agents in a speech at Quantico, Virginia. He said "By keeping drug money from financing terror, you're playing an important part of this war." And we will continue doing so.
A narco-terrorist organization is an organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking to further or fund premeditated, politically motivated violence to influence a government or group of people. Although the DEA does not specifically target terrorists, some of the powerful international drug trafficking organizations we have targeted have never hesitated to use violence and terror to advance their interests. As of October 2003, the DEA has identified seventeen Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as designated by the Department of State, with potential ties to the drug trade. More generally, we know that drugs and terror frequently share a common ground of geography, money, and violence.
Our headquarters is only about 700 yards from the Pentagon, and DEA shook, literally and figuratively, when the terrorists attacked on September 11, 2001. DEA mobilized resources immediately, lending more than one hundred Special Agents to the Sky Marshal program, supporting the FBI investigation through the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and fifty loaned Intelligence Analysts, and debriefing all of its Confidential Sources in an attempt to gain any available information on the attacks. Since the attack, EPIC has processed well over 200,000 terrorism inquiries.
During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit at its Special Operations Division. This multi-agency unit coordinates all DEA intelligence and investigations having a possible nexus to terrorism and shares information with agencies responsible for coordinating terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug investigations have generated such narco-terrorist related intelligence and investigations both domestically and internationally. DEA also has assigned personnel to various FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country and maintains liaison with the Department of Homeland Security.
Evaluating Links between Drugs and Terrorism
Past domestic investigations have shown the clear potential for drug money to fund terrorist groups. In October 2001, a joint DEA/FBI investigation targeting two heroin traffickers in Peshawar, Pakistan led to the seizure of 1.4 kilograms of heroin in Maryland and identification of two suspected money launderers, one with suspected ties to al Qaida. Similarly, Operation Marble Palace in 2001 determined that several members of a targeted heroin trafficking organization had possible ties to the Taliban and that a connected bank account had been used to launder proceeds to alleged Taliban supporters in Pakistan.
Based on that demonstrated potential, many have suggested that there must be financial ties between drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan. At this time, we do not have evidence capable of sustaining an indictment of direct links between terrorism and narcotics trafficking groups within Afghanistan. To the extent that allegations have been raised based on more than speculation, they generally come from single sources. Clear corroborating evidence of such sources has been difficult to obtain, in part because many traditional investigative techniques cannot be used within the country for reasons I have previously explained.
Raw intelligence and uncorroborated confidential sources continue to indicate possible relationships between drug traffic and terrorist groups within Afghanistan. The DEA will continue to assign the highest priority to investigating any information linking drugs to terrorism. We will do so in cooperation with our law enforcement and intelligence partners, and we will aggressively work to gather and document intelligence relating to drug activity that may finance terrorism.
The Drug/Financial Fusion Center recently created by Congress will use the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force's architecture to enhance capabilities to uncover links between drug trafficking and terrorism. Investigative links between drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and known terrorist organizations will be shared with the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Treasury Department and the intelligence community. Additionally, our intelligence programs continue to work closely with law enforcement and the intelligence community to identify and anticipate emerging threats posed by the links between drug trafficking and terrorism.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, control of drug production in Afghanistan and its potential ties to terrorism is an agencywide priority for the DEA. I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Tuesday, August 9, 2011
Sunday, August 7, 2011
Mexico drugs
Friday, August 5, 2011
Iran drugs
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Pentagon super elite forces
Friday, July 29, 2011
Saturday, July 23, 2011
Congress doesn't care about nuclear terrorism
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
Sunday, July 17, 2011
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Monday, July 11, 2011
Sunday, July 10, 2011
John Walker Lindh
Friday, July 8, 2011
Suicide rates up in Europe
Saturday, July 2, 2011
Europe to privatize assets everywhere
Thursday, June 30, 2011
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Monday, June 27, 2011
Greece bailout
Sunday, June 26, 2011
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Greece debt germany
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Iran Pakistan Afghanistan
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Monday, June 6, 2011
US energy eurasia
Saturday, June 4, 2011
Saturday, May 21, 2011
Obama Middle East speech
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Canada in Iraq War
Monday, May 16, 2011
NATO SCO Afghanistan
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Greece crisis euro
Mexico drugs money laundering
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
bin Laden Taliban offers
Another article is here.
Torture and bin Laden
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Al Qaeda and Guantanamo files
Monday, April 25, 2011
Iraq Media
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
Oil companies Iraq
Monday, April 11, 2011
Sunday, April 3, 2011
Drug money laundering by US banks
Friday, April 1, 2011
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Dean Baker TARP
Robert Samuelson's Troubled TARP Arithmetic
We know that arithmetic is not the strong suit of the Washington Post and Robert Samuelson drives this point home again today with his discussion of the TARP. Samuelson tells us that TARP is now projected to cost just $19 billion and that the final cost may actually be lower. He also tells us that the alternative to TARP, bank nationalization would have been far more costly. And, he said that without TARP the unemployment rate "would be 11 percent or 14 percent; it certainly wouldn’t be 8.9 percent."Okay, let's take these in turn. First, the idea that the TARP cost almost nothing is based on some very shoddy accounting. Samuelson apparently does not understand the idea of money carrying an opportunity cost.
Suppose the government lent me $1 trillion for 10 years at 1 percent annual interest. In the Robert Samuelson world, the government is earning a $100 billion profit on this investment ($10 billion a year for 10 years). Economists familiar with opportunity costs would instead see this as a huge loss to the government, since it is giving me an enormous loan at an interest rate that is several percentage points below the market rate.
We saw how this worked with the TARP when Warren Buffett reported earning twice the money on his investment in Goldman Sachs which was half of the size of the investment from Treasury. Buffett got the market rate of return on his investment, the difference was a subsidy from taxpayers to the shareholders and executives of Goldman. The same story was true with the other TARP loans, as well as the even larger amount of money lent through the Fed as well as the guarantees provided by the FDIC.
This gets back to the comparison with the option of nationalizing the bankrupt banks, which Samuelson asserts would have been far more costly. Each year, the large banks are pulling over $100 billion a year out of the economy in profits. They also pay their executives tens of billions of dollars each year. Let's say that this sum comes to around $150 billion a year in total or 1 percent of GDP.
This money would not be pulled out of the economy if the banks had been nationalized. This is money that would have been available for other purposes (e.g. it could have paid for higher wages for ordinary workers) rather than supporting the consumption of bank shareholders and executives. The way this would work practically is that the Fed could stimulate the economy more with lower interest rates (think of some future point when the economy is closer to full employment) allowing for workers’ wages to raise, because we do not have $150 billion or so in consumption by these shareholders and executives.
If we take the discounted value of this sum over the next thirty years it would come to more than $3.5 trillion. This can be viewed as the cost of the TARP and related rescue programs compared with nationalization. (Samuelson tells us that nationalization would have been complicated, so was TARP. Life's tough.)
Finally, Samuelson tells us that without the TARP unemployment would be "11 percent or 14 percent: it certainly wouldn't be 8.9 percent." This is incredibly bad logic. These numbers are based on a counter-factual in which the government and the Fed let the financial system collapse and then did nothing by way of response. These are undoubtedly reasonable projections of the unemployment rate under such circumstances, however that is not a plausible counter-factual.
If Samuelson paid attention to what he was writing he would note another possible response, bank nationalization. If the Fed had taken over the bankrupt banks and then flooded the system with money (as it did with the TARP and related Fed liquidity programs) then we would not have seen the rise in unemployment from these projections.
Samuelson's analysis would be comparable to noting that a particular fire hose was used to put out a school fire, saving dozens of children. Samuelson would then tell us that this fire hose saved dozens of children. While this would literally be true, if that particular fire hose did not exist, the firefighters would have extinguished the fire with the other one they had on the truck. In other words, the alternative was not that the children would die, the alternative was that they would use a different hose.
In the same vein, the alternative to TARP was not that we sit around with a collapsed banking system waiting for the economy to sort itself out on its own. The alternative was a different set of monetary actions to boost the economy. It is silly to tout this no-hose story as the counter-factual to TARP.
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Kill team in Afghanistan
Monday, March 28, 2011
Libya social science
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Arab world internet freedom
Saturday, March 26, 2011
Libya rebels linked to Al Qaeda
Thursday, March 24, 2011
US oil companies in Libya
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Iran nuclear India
Even after India's second vote, the leaked cables suggest there was no lessening of the pressure to tow the American line on Iran. And the fate of the civil nuclear agreement was the bait. “India is clearly rattled by Iran's refusal (after the IAEA votes) to confirm the preferential price for the sale of five million tonnes of LNG per year, and perceives that some conciliatory motions would help salvage its important energy relationship,” a March 27, 2006 cable ( 58266: confidential) noted. “However, we have made clear to the GOI that dallying with Iran is not only dangerous for regional stability but also puts at risk Congressional support for the civil nuclear deal.”
Chomsky arab world
Friday, March 18, 2011
Libya and oil intervention
Disconnect on Afghanistan
Afghanistan civilian casualties
Thursday, March 17, 2011
Drugs North Korea
ICG on Libya
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW MEDIA RELEASE
Open Letter to the UN Security Council on the Situation in Libya
Brussels, 16 March 2011:
Excellency,
In light of the grave situation in Libya, we urge Security Council Members to take immediate effective action aimed at achieving a ceasefire in place and initiating negotiations to secure a transition to a legitimate and representative government. This action should be backed by the credible threat of appropriate military intervention, as a last resort, to prevent mass atrocities.
We welcome the steps taken thus far by the Security Council, including an asset freeze, arms embargo and the threat of prosecution for war crimes. These were adopted in response to widespread abuses against civilians and were meant to prevent a humanitarian disaster. But the situation has now evolved into a full-scale civil war. The most urgent goal now must be to end the violence and halt further loss of life, while paving the way toward a political transition, objectives that require a different response.
Imposing a no-flight zone, which many have been advocating, would, in and of itself, achieve neither of these. It would not stop the violence or accelerate a peaceful resolution. Nor would it materially impede the regime from crushing resistance. Government forces appear to be gaining the advantage mainly on account of their superiority on the ground, not air power. In short, a no-flight zone under existing circumstances would not address the threat of mass atrocities it purports to tackle. The debate over this issue is inhibiting the necessary reflection on the best course of action.
If the objective is, as it should be, first and foremost to end the killing, there are only two genuine options. One is an international military intervention explicitly on the side of the revolt with the avowed goal of ensuring its victory or, at a minimum, preventing its defeat. Given widespread lack of knowledge of the situation on the ground, it is unclear what it will take to achieve this. At a minimum, however, this would involve providing the rebel forces with substantial military assistance and taking action against Qaddafi's forces. Should those measures not suffice, it could well require direct military involvement on the ground. It is incumbent on those pressing this view to think through its logical imp lications;2 0it would be reckless to enter a military confrontation on the optimistic assumption that it will be ended quickly, only to see it turn into a bloody, protracted war.
Although there are legitimate arguments for a swift and massive military intervention on the opposition's behalf, it presents considerable risks. Besides the obvious downsides entailed in what could well come to be viewed as another Western military engagement in a Muslim country and the Middle East and North Africa region, it could also lead to large-scale loss of life as well as precipitate a political vacuum in Libya in which various forces engage in a potentially prolonged and violent struggle for supremacy before anything resembling a state and stable government are reestablished. Such a situation could lead to wider regional instability and could be exploited by terrorist movements, notably Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
The alternative option, which Crisis Group has advocated, is to engage in a vigorous political effort to achieve an immediate ceasefire in place to be followed by the prompt opening of a dialogue on the modalities of a transition to a new government that the Libyan people will accept as legitimate. To that end, we urge the Council to delegate a regional contact group composed of officials or respected personalities drawn from Arab and African countries, including Libya's neighbours, to initiate discussions with the regime and the opposition without delay. Their mandate would be to secure agreement on:
- An immediate ceasefire in place, which respects international humanitarian law;
- Dispatch of a peacekeeping force drawn primarily from the armed forces of regional states to act as a buffer, operating under a Security Council mandate and with the support of the Arab League and African Union;
- Initiation of a dialogue between the regime and opposition aimed at definitively ending the bloodshed and beginning the necessary transition to representative, accountable and legitimate government
To enhance the credibility of the threat to use all necessary means -- including military steps beyond the imposition of a no-flight zone – to protect against mass atrocities, member states should begin planning for such an eventuality. The Security Council has a responsibility to live up to its commitments, even and especially if a member state does not.
Crisis Group’s proposal addresses head-on the overwhelming priorities of stopping the bloodshed and initiating the necessary political transition in a way that avoids the dangerous prospect of a political vacuum and is in line with both the African Union’s proposal for African mediation and the Arab League’s recognition that Arab countries have a role to play. It further backs up the vital and long overdue political effort we have called for with the only kind of military deployment that can help end the violence rather than aggravate it. We urge the Security Council to adopt this proposal and to take immediate steps to put it into effect.
Sincere regards,
Louise Arbour
President and CEO
International Crisis Group
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Mexico drugs
Friday, March 11, 2011
Weisbrot guardian
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
US staff influences Afghan Interior Ministry
Another former senior Interior Ministry official, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue, said that Afghans wanted to develop the police as a law enforcement force, but that American advisers, holding the upper hand because they also held the purse strings, pushed through training the police as a counterterrorism force instead.
US prisoners make missiles
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Mainstream view
US agents let guns into Mexico
Friday, March 4, 2011
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Egypt run up to protests
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Libya and oil and US intervention
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Academy political views
Friday, February 25, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Tzipi Livni article
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Ireland hotel workers wages attacked
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Egypt revolution
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
US Korea FTA
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Canada Afghanistan warlords
Saturday, February 12, 2011
US military aid to Israel
Labor at center of Mid East protests
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Egypt
Egypt military tortures, Secret Services trained by US too
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Opinion polls on defense spending
Taliban reconciliation attempts in 2002
EU weapons sales to North Africa
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Police and Taliban equally mistrusted in Afghan South
Saturday, February 5, 2011
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Baker on debt
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
Baker economic crisis articles
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Saturday, January 29, 2011
US made gas canisters
The US has also given some funding to "democracy promotion" in Egypt but the amounts are much much smaller than those for military aid to the regime. Some of the democracy funds are even given to the government instead of real democratic orgnizations.
US and Middle East revolts
Regarding Tunisia, the U.S. government was silent during the first weeks of protests despite savage repression by the government. Less than a week after the uprising began, Congress voted for an addition $12 million in security assistance to Ben Ali’s regime. Tear gas canisters lobbed at pro-democracy demonstrators were inscribed with the words “Made in USA,” a reminder of whose side Washington was on in the struggle against the dictatorship. By early January, the State Department began issuing mild criticism of the Ben Ali regime for firing live ammunition into crowds of demonstrators but was equally willing to blame the pro-democracy activists. While the movement was largely nonviolent, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley chose to characterize it by its most unruly components. He stated that the Obama administration was "concerned about government actions, but we're also concerned about actions by the demonstrators, those who do not have peaceful intentions."
He also has links to a Freedom House study that says that after examining the 67 transitions from authoritarian regimes to varying degrees of democratic governments over the past few decades, concluded that they came overwhelmingly through democratic civil society organizations using nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance. Such transitions did not result from foreign invasion and came about only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary, elite-driven reforms.
And in another study on civil resistance of more than 300 struggles for self-determination against colonialism, military occupation, and colonial rule over the past century, Maria Stephan and Erica Chenowith noted that nonviolent struggles were more than twice as likely to succeed as armed struggles.
In short nonviolent uprisings work:
Throughout the world, in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, in recent years there has been a dramatic growth of the use of strategic nonviolent action. In contrast to armed struggles, these nonviolent insurrections are movements of organized popular resistance to government authority. Either consciously or by necessity, they eschew the use of weapons of modern warfare. Unlike conventional political movements, nonviolent campaigns usually employ tactics outside the mainstream political processes of electioneering and lobbying. These tactics may include strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations, the popular contestation of public space, tax refusal, destruction of symbols of government authority (such as official identification cards), refusal to obey official orders (such as curfew restrictions), and the creation of alternative institutions for political legitimacy and social organization.
Friday, January 28, 2011
Middle East protests
NYT wikileaks
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Coca leaf
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
US isolates Karzai
Sunday, January 23, 2011
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Colombia trains anti-drug Mexico
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Tunisia example
it is "the power of the Tunisian example", as 6 North Africans have now set themselves on fire to protest in various countries.
Monday, January 17, 2011
Afghan opinion
In informal discussions with villagers and residents
of Kandahar city and surrounding districts it was evident that locals don’t really understand
the purpose of this so called ‘surge’. Most believe it will end like previous operations in the
south, in failure, bringing only more grief and sorrow to their homes and villages. Indeed,
many Kandaharis have come to believe that coalition military operations result only in the
death, injury, arrest and dishonouring of innocent Afghan civilians who have nothing to do
with the Taliban.
This said, nor do Kandaharis want the coalition to leave. They see a role for coalition military
forces in the province, albeit one that focuses less on active military operations and more on
stabilisation and peace-building ones.
If there is, however, one overriding reason why locals have little confidence in US-led
operations in Kandahar it is the continued failure of American and coalition forces to
understand local context and dynamics and the impact of their stalled operations on the local
population.
Afghanistan media
Taliban ideology
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Friday, January 14, 2011
Mexico drug war death data
Thursday, January 13, 2011
Conservatives and Afghanistan
NYT freedom of speech wikileaks
New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller told readers in an online exchange that the newspaper has suggested to its media partners and to WikiLeaks what information it believes should be withheld.
"We agree wholeheartedly that transparency is not an absolute good," Keller wrote. "Freedom of the press includes freedom not to publish, and that is a freedom we exercise with some regularity."
The article also explains how wikileaks cables are released and redacted by the media organizations.